In this paper, we discuss security of the six-state quantum key distribution protocol against intercept/resend attacks and collective attacks. For the intercept/resend attacks, we evaluate a probability that the legitimate users, Alice and Bob, do not notice interference caused by the eavesdropper Eve and a probability that Eve obtains a secret bit sent by Alice. For the collective attacks, we estimate not only the above two probabilities but also Eve's Shannon information. In the assessment of the security against the collective attacks, imposing looser constraints upon Eve's strategies than Bechmann-Pasquinucci and Gisin, we reach substantially the same result as their study. In other words, although we let Eve's strategies satisfy lower symmetry than Bechmann-Pasquinucci and Gisin, both their work and ours attain the same conclusion, i.e. the identical, unique, and optimum strategy. This implies that we obtain Eve's best tactic by applying simpler conditions to it than Bechmann-Pasquinucci and Gisin, so that this result is novel. Finally, we consider a relation between the six-state protocol and the E91 scheme. We show that the intercept/resend attacks can always be described by hidden variable models. In contrast, we demonstrate that we cannot regard the collective attacks as the hidden variable theories if the disturbance is smaller than 1/3.
Introduction
The six-state quantum key distribution protocol [1, 2] is a natural extension of the wellknown BB84 four-state scheme, which was proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [3] . The six-state protocol uses three bases rather than two ones, which are utilized by the BB84 scheme. Although the six-state quantum key distribution protocol is regarded as less practical than the BB84 scenario, it has theoretically interesting features, so that many researchers have investigated it.
The BB84 procedure of quantum cryptography is designed for realizing secure key distribution between two parties, Alice and Bob. In the original BB84 scheme, Alice randomly chooses between two conjugate quantum bases in a two-dimensional Hilbert space and sends secretly a random binary number with a quantum bit (qubit) in the chosen basis. On the one hand, if Bob detects the qubit transmitted from Alice with the identical basis that Alice chooses, Bob obtains the correct secret bit. On the other hand, if Bob measures a state of the qubit sent by Alice in the basis which is different from Alice's one, an outcome of his observation is totally random. During the BB84 scheme, Alice sends one of four states included in the two conjugate bases at random.
Because the BB84 protocol has a long tradition, its properties have been studied eagerly and vastly [4, 5] . Especially, its practical aspects have been investigated very much [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11] . The BB84 scheme was proven unconditionally secure against an enemy who was able to mount arbitrary attacks permitted by quantum mechanics [12, 13, 14, 15] .
Because the six-state protocol is a direct descendant of the BB84 procedure, it inherits many qualities of the BB84 scheme. The six-state protocol has been studied already by many researchers. Bruß examined security of the six-state protocol against eavesdropping on a single qubit, which was not classified as a collective attack [1] . Bechmann-Pasquinucci and Gisin investigated collective and coherent attacks on the six-state protocol [2] . The unconditional security of the six-state scheme has been proved already [16] . Informationtheoretic security proof for the six-state protocol with one-way error correction and privacy amplification was presented [17] . Intercept/resend attacks on the six-state protocol over noisy channels were examined [18] . The security proof of the six-state protocol with threshold detectors was investigated for practical purposes [19] .
In the current paper, we examine security of the six-state protocol against intercept/resend attacks and collective attacks. First, for the intercept/resend attacks, we estimate a probability that Alice and Bob do not notice Eve's illegal acts and a probability that Eve obtains a secret bit sent by Alice. Second, for the collective attacks, using Bruß's results [1] , we estimate not only the above two probabilities but also Eve's Shannon information. In the analyses of both these attacks, we find evidences that the six-state protocol is safer than the BB84 scheme.
Third, we show that we can regard the six-state protocol as a simplified version of the E91 scenario, which is a quantum key distribution scheme proposed by Ekert in 1991 [20] . From the connection between the six-state protocol and the E91 scheme, we can show that the intercept/resend attack is equivalent to the hidden variable model. Contrastingly, we demonstrate that the collective attack cannot be described by the hidden variable theory if the disturbance is smaller than 1/3. In order to investigate the security against the collective attack, we apply looser constraints to Eve's strategies than Bechmann-Pasquinucci and Gisin and we arrive at substantially the same result as their work [2] . In other words, although we impose lower symmetry upon Eve's strategies than Bechmann-Pasquinucci and Gisin, both of them attain the same conclusion, i.e. the identical, unique, and optimum strategy. This implies that we obtain Eve's best tactic by assuming simpler conditions than Bechmann-Pasquinucci and Gisin, so that this result is novel.
In the current paper, we emphasize that analyses of the security for the six-state protocol are simpler than those for the BB84 scheme. This is because the number of the quantum sates that the six-state protocol uses is larger than the BB84 scheme, so that more restrictions are placed on the six-state protocol than the BB84 scenario. This fact makes the problem concerning the six-state protocol easier than the BB84 procedure. In fact, when we look for the optimum strategy for the collective attack on the six-state protocol, we have to optimize only a single real parameter. Contrastingly, according to Cirac and Gisin's work [21] , if we want to find the optimum strategy for the collective attack on the BB84 scheme, we need to carry out optimization of two real parameters. This simplicity of the six-state protocol suggests that Alice and Bob can predict strategies of Eve's attacks more easily than the BB84 procedure. This is one of the advantages that the six-state protocol owns.
Because the unconditional security of the six-state protocol has been proved already, some might complain that precise analyses of the intercept/resend attacks and collective attacks are useless. However, we think that each attack has to be examined in detail for practical uses because investigation of actual defects included in each Eve's attack gives technical merits to Alice and Bob.
As mentioned above, the six-state protocol is the natural extended version of the BB84 scheme. In the BB84 scheme, Alice and Bob communicate with each other using one of two orthonormal bases, which is defined on the two-dimensional Hilbert space, independently. We name these bases the z basis and the x basis. The z basis consists of the following two vectors:
The x basis is formed from
In addition to these bases, the six-state protocol utilize the following y basis:
Hence, in the six-state protocol, the legitimate users send and receive six vectors, {|0 z , |1 z }, {|0 x , |1 x }, and {|0 y , |1 y }, at random with an equal probability.
The current paper is organized as follows. In Sec. 2, we give a brief review of Bruß's results. In Sec. 3, we examine the security of the six-state protocol against the intercept/resend attacks. In Sec. 4, we investigate Eve's optimum strategy of the collective attack. In Sec. 5, we evaluate the Shannon information obtained by Eve in the collective attack. In Sec. 6, we study a connection between the six-state protocol and the E91 scenario. In Sec. 7, we give discussion and the conclusions.
Results obtained by Bruß
In this section, we review results obtained by Bruß [1] . These results play an important role in Sec. 4 for analysing security of the six-state protocol against collective attacks.
We consider Eve's following illegal acts. First, Eve lets her own probe interact with a single qubit which is sent by Alice through the quantum channel. That is to say, Eve applies a unitary transformation to both her probe and the single qubit transmitted from Alice. Second, Eve sends the single qubit to Bob. Third, Eve leaves her own probe untouched until Alice and Bob disclose their public discussion via the classical channel. Fourth, depending on Alice and Bob's public information about which basis is used for their quantum transmission, the z basis, the x basis, or the y basis, Eve measures her probe and guesses at a secret bit Alice sends.
In the above procedure, the most general unitary operator U that Eve applies to her probe and the transmitted single qubit is given as follows:
where |X denotes the initial state of Eve's probe, and |A , |B , |C , and |D represent arbitrary normalized vectors. Here, we assume that Alice and Bob send and receive the single qubit with the z basis, {|0 z , |1 z } = {|0 , |1 }. Then, on the one hand, a probability that Alice transmits |0 z and Bob detects |0 z is equal to the fidelity F . On the other hand, a probability that Alice emits |1 z and Bob obtains |1 z is given by the fidelity F ′ . If F = F ′ holds, Alice and Bob can repeat quantum communications with the z basis many times, obtain values of F and F ′ as statistical averages, become aware of F = F ′ , and finally notice Eve's malicious acts. Hence, Eve had better make an attack with F = F ′ . Therefore, from now on, we assume that F = F ′ is satisfied in Eq. (4). It is clear that the dimension of a Hilbert space for Eve's probe is equal to four at the most because the states of the probe are given by |A , |B , |C , and |D in Eq. (4) except the initial state |X . Then, we can put 1/2 ≤ F < 1 without loss of generality.
Moreover, we assume that the fidelity is equal to F even if Alice and Bob communicate with both the x basis and the y basis. First, we think about the x basis. We let the following equation hold:
Then, we obtain
Second, we consider a case relating to the y basis. We assume that the following equation is satisfied:
Thus, we obtain
Furthermore, because U is a unitary operator, U|0 |X and U|1 |X are orthogonal to each other. Thus, we reach a relation,
Because of Eqs. (6) and (9), we obtain
From Eqs. (11) and (12), we attain
Equations (7) and (10) lead to the following relation:
Substituting Eq. (14) into Eqs. (7) and (10), we arrive at
From the above discussion, we finally come to Bruß's conclusion that Eqs. (11), (13), (14) , and (15) hold.
The security against the intercept/resend attacks
In this section, we consider a situation where Eve makes the intercept/resend attack on the quantum channel. Eve observes a single qubit sent by Alice with an arbitrary twodimensional orthonormal basis {|ξ 0 , |ξ 1 } and resends an alternative qubit whose state is given by either |ξ 0 or |ξ 1 to Bob according to the result of her measurement.
First of all, we define projection operators as
Next, we consider explicit forms of P (ξ 0 ) and P (ξ 1 ). We can write down an arbitrary rotation matrix of SU(2), V (α, β, γ), as follows [22] :
where 0 ≤ α < 4π, 0 ≤ β < 4π, and 0 ≤ γ < 4π. Then, P (ξ 0 ) and P (ξ 1 ) are given in the forms,
If Eve detects |ξ 0 , she judges that Alice sends a secret bit '0' through the quantum channel. By contrast, observing |ξ 1 , Eve believes that Alice emits a secret bit '1' via the quantum transmission.
We define P t as a probability that Eve makes an accurate guess at a secret bit Alice sends in the case where both Alice and Bob choose the t basis for t ∈ {x, y, z}. We also define Q t as a probability that Alice and Bob do not notice Eve's illegal acts in the case both of them communicate with the t basis. Then, P t and Q t are written in the forms
Substitution of Eqs. (1), (2), (3), (18) , and (19) into Eq. (20) gives P z = cos 2 (β/2), Q z = cos 4 (β/2) + sin 4 (β/2),
Here, we assume that Eve selects strategies that have symmetry P x = P y = P z for eavesdropping. Thus, because of P x = P y , we obtain sin α = cos α. Then, we can put a range of α values as 0 ≤ α < 2π without loss of generality. Hence, we arrive at α = π/4, 5π/4.
First, we consider a case where α = π/4 is satisfied. Then, from Eq. (21), we obtain
Here, we can put a range of β values as 0 ≤ β < 2π without loss of generality. Because of P x = P y = P z , we obtain two values for β as
On the one hand, if β is given by Eq. (23), P x , P y , and P z can be estimated at
On the other hand, if β is given by Eq. (24), they are equal to
Thus, we conclude that Eq. (24) is the optimum solution.
Second, we consider a case where α = 5π/4 holds. Then, from Eq. (21), we obtain
Because of P x = P y = P z , putting 0 ≤ β < 2π, we obtain the following two values for β:
If β is given by Eq. (28), we arrive at Eq. (25) . In contrast, if β is given by Eq. (29), we reach Eq. (26). Hence, we come to a conclusion that Eq. (29) is the optimum solution.
If α = π/4 holds and β is given by Eq. (24), we obtain
Similarly, if we put α = 5π/4 and Eq. (29) is satisfied, we obtain Eq. (30), too. Throughout the above discussion, we only impose the symmetry P x = P y = P z upon Eve's strategies. Thus, Eve's optimum intercept/resend attacks are given by α = π/4,
]. If Eve makes the optimum intercept/resend attack, the probability that Eve guesses right at the secret bit Alice sends is equal to around 0.7887 and the probability that Alice and Bob do not become aware of Eve's malicious acts is given by 2/3.
Here, we compare the six-state protocol and the BB84 scheme concerning the intercept/resend attack. For the BB84 scenario, Eve's best strategy for the intercept/resend attack is projection measurement with the Breidbart basis [4] . Using the Breidbart basis for the BB84 scheme, Eve can guess right at the secret bit sent by Alice with a probability (1/4)(2 + √ 2) ≃ 0.8536 and Alice and Bob cannot notice Eve's illegal acts with a probability 3/4. Thus, the six-state protocol is safer than the BB84 scheme for Eve's intercept/resend attack.
Eve's optimum strategy of the collective attack
In this section, we examine Eve's optimum strategy of the collective attack on the six-state protocol. In the collective attack, Eve looks into each qubit sent by Alice individually using entanglement between her probe and the qubit. What she has to do is as follows. First, Eve prepares her own probe whose initial state is given by |X . Second, Eve causes interaction between her probe and the single qubit sent by Alice with a proper unitary transformation. Third, leaving her probe untouched, Eve sends the single qubit to Bob. Fourth, according to Alice and Bob's public discussion about which basis they use for the quantum transmission, the x basis, the y basis, or the z basis, Eve observes her probe. Fifth, from a result of her measurement of the probe, Eve makes a guess at the secret bit sent by Alice. In this attack, it is important that Eve can change a method for measuring her probe depending on public information Alice and Bob disclose through the classical channel.
The process explained above is equivalent to that discussed by Bruß in Sec. 2. Thus, throughout this section, we assume that Eq. (4) is satisfied with F = F ′ . Moreover, we assume that the results obtained by Bruß hold, that is to say, we can put Eqs. (11) , (13), (14) , and (15) into effect during this section. Then, we adopt the following notation for the sake of convenience hereafter,
From Eqs. (1), (2), (3), (4) with F = F ′ , and (31), we obtain the following relations,
Here, we impose the following symmetry on Eve's attack in analogy with Cirac and Gisin's work [21] : (13), (14), (15) , (32), (33), and (34), we apparently obtain the following relations:
Moreover, on the one hand, Eq. (32) leads to
On the other hand, with the help of Eqs. (14), (15) , and (33), we obtain
Substitution of Eqs. (11), (13), (37), and (38) into E z 00 |E z 11 = E x 00 |E x 11 gives
where α = Im A|B = −Im D|C , β = Im A|D = −Im B|C .
Furthermore, from Eqs. (14) , (15) , and (34), we obtain
Substitution of Eqs. (11), (13), (37), and (41) into E z 00 |E z 11 = E y 00 |E y 11 leads to
where
From Eqs. (39) and (42), we derive
Because of Eqs. (14) and (32), we obtain
Contrastingly, from Eqs. (14) , (15) , (33), and (40), we reach
Thus, with the help of E z 01 |E z 10 = E x 01 |E x 10 , we arrive at
Next, Eqs. (14), (15) , (34), and (43) provide us with
Thus, E z 01 |E z 10 = E y 01 |E y 10 leads to
Then, from Eqs. (47) and (49), we obtain
From Eqs. (44) and (50), we reach
Moreover, from Eqs. (32), (40), and (43), we attain
By contrast, because of Eqs. (13) , (14) , (33), (40), and (43), we obtain
The relation E z 00 |E z 01 = E x 00 |E x 01 leads to
Furthermore, with the help of Eqs. (13) , (14), (34), (40), and (43), we arrive at
From the relation E z 00 |E z 01 = E y 00 |E y 01 , we obtain 
From Eq. (52), we reach E t 00 |E t 01 = 0 ∀t ∈ {x, y, z}. Because of the above discussion, we obtain a relation,
From the above results, the following relations are automatically satisfied:
Finally, we come to the conclusion that Eve's unitary operator U is uniquely and perfectly determined by a single parameter Re A|C and the following relations hold:
At the close of this section, we have to point out that Eqs. (66) and (67) were provided in Ref. [2] . In Ref. [2] , although Bechmann-Pasquinucci and Gisin started arguments from different constraints imposed on the unitary operator U, their study and ours reach the same results.
The Shannon information obtained by Eve in the collective attack
In this section, in order to consider the security against Eve's collective attack discussed in Sec. 4, we evaluate the following physical quantities. The first quantity is the probability that Alice and Bob do not notice Eve's interference. The second one is the probability that Eve guesses right at the secret bit sent by Alice. The third one is the Shannon information Eve obtains. First, we define Q AB as the probability that Alice and Bob do not become aware of Eve's illegal acts. Because Q AB is a probability that Alice and Bob detect the same bit value with the same basis, it can be written down as
Second, we define P E as the probability that Eve makes an accurate guess at the secret bit sent by Alice. We estimate P E as follows. We assume that both Alice and Bob send and receive the qubit with the z basis. Then, Eve has to distinguish between four quantum states {|E z ij : i, j ∈ {0, 1}}. We describe a unique single parameter that characterizes Eve's unitary operator U as Re A|C = cos θ.
(69) From Eq. (66) and (69), we can also write the fidelity F with cos θ. Because of the discussion in Sec. 4, we obtain the following relations:
Thus, on the one hand, Eve cannot distinguish between |E z 00 and |E z 11 with a probability of unity by making the orthogonal measurement. On the other hand, she can recognize the difference between other states perfectly with the orthogonal measurement.
Here, we estimate a probability that Eve can tell the difference between |E z 00 and |E z 11 . We define the following two density operators:
We describe a two-dimensional Hilbert space spanned by {|E z 00 , |E z 11 } as H ′ . Then, ρ z 00 and ρ z 11 are defined on H ′ . An orthonormal basis {|e 0 , |e 1 } defined on H ′ is given by
We can write down matrix representations of ρ z 00 and ρ z 11 with the basis {|e 0 , |e 1 } as
where 0 ≤ θ < π.
Here, we define the trace distance as follows [23] :
where |X| = √ X † X for an arbitrary operator X. We write the maximum probability that Eve can distinguish between |E z 00 and |E z 11 as P max 00, 11 . It is shown in Ref. [24] that P max 00,11 is provided by the following formula:
Moreover, letting P max 01,10 be the maximum probability that Eve can recognize the difference between |E z 01 and |E z 10 , we apparently obtain P max 01,10 = 1.
Now, we divide the four states {|E z ij : i, j ∈ {0, 1}} into two groups, {|E z 00 , |E z 11 } and {|E z 01 , |E z 10 }. We have described the maximum probability that Eve can distinguish between |E z 00 and |E z 11 as P max 00,11 and written down the maximum probability that she can recognize difference between |E z 01 and |E z 10 as P max 01, 10 . If Alice detects the signal |0 z , a probability that the state of Eve's probe collapses to |E z 00 is equal to F and a probability that it irreversibly falls into |E z 01 is given by (1 − F ). Similarly, if Alice observes the signal |1 z , a probability that the state of Eve's probe collapses to |E z 11 is given by F and a probability that it irreversibly falls into |E z 10 is equal to (1 − F ). Thus, if Alice and Bob communicate with the z basis, we can define the maximum probability P max |0 ,|1 that Eve makes an accurate guess at a random secret bit sent by Alice as P max |0 ,|1 = F P max 00,11 + (1 − F )P max 01,10
From Eq. (66), we obtain
Making use of Eq. (78) and putting D = 1 − F , we can write down P max |0 ,|1 as follows: Figure 1 : Graphs of P E as functions of the disturbance D. The thick solid and thin dashed curves represent P E for the six-state protocol given by Eq. (80) and P E for the BB84 scheme given by Eq. (85), respectively. Looking at both the graphs of P E , we notice the following properties. If D = 0, we obtain P E = 1/2, so that Eve makes a completely random guess at the secret bit sent by Alice. Contrastingly, if D = 1/2, P E = 1 holds and Eve guesses absolutely right at the secret bit that Alice sends. For 0 ≤ D ≤ 1/2, P E increases monotonically. From both the graphs, we conclude that the six-state protocol is safer than the BB84 scheme. 83) and I E for the BB84 scheme given by Eq. (87), respectively. Turning our eyes to both the two graphs, we become aware of the following features. If D = 0, we obtain I E = 0, so that Eve cannot gain any information. By contrast, if D = 1/2, I E = 1 holds and Eve makes a completely accurate guess at the random secret bit sent by Alice. For 0 ≤ D ≤ 1/2, I E increases monotonically. Looking at both the two graphs, we conclude that the six-state protocol is safer than the BB84 scheme.
where we assume that the disturbance D satisfies 0 < D ≤ 1/2. Obviously, in quantum transmission with an arbitrary t basis ∀t ∈ {x, y, z}, the maximum probability that Eve guesses right at a random secret bit sent by Alice is equal to P max |0 ,|1 given in Eq. (79). Finally, we attain the following results:
In Fig. 1 , we plot a graph of P E as a function of the disturbance D.
Next, we think about Eve's Shannon information I E . The Shannon information Eve gains is defined as
where H(P ) = P log 2 P + (1 − P ) log 2 (1 − P ). 
In Fig. 2 , we draw a graph of I E as a function of the disturbance D.
For your reference, we compare results for the collective attacks on the BB84 scheme and those obtained above. According to Cirac and Gisin's work, the following two parameters characterize Eve's unitary operator U for collective attacks under specific symmetry in the BB84 scheme [21] :
If G = F (2F − 1) holds, the probability that Eve makes an accurate guess at a random secret bit sent by Alice becomes maximum, and we obtain
Then, the probability that Alice and Bob cannot notice Eve's interference is given by
We plot a graph of P E provided by Eq. (85) in Fig. 1 . Moreover, the Shannon information I E that Eve gains is written in the form,
We plot a graph of I E given by Eq. (87) in Fig. 2 . From Figs. 1 and 2 , we can conclude that the six-state protocol is safer than the BB84 scheme.
A connection between the six-state protocol and the E91 scenario
We can regard the six-state protocol as a simplified version of the E91 scenario. In the E91 procedure, a source generates the maximally entangled state for a pair of qubits and these qubits fly apart towards Alice and Bob as follows:
where indices A and B represent Alice and Bob, respectively. Now, we assume that Alice and Bob each observe their qubits with one of the following three Hermitian operators randomly and independently:
where e x = (1, 0, 0), e y = (0, 1, 0), and e z = (0, 0, 1). If Alice observes E(e z ) A and detects |0 z A , the state of Bob's qubit collapses to |1 z B . By contrast, if Alice perceives |1 z A , the state of Bob's qubit falls into |0 z B . If Alice performs measurement of E(e x ) A or E(e y ) A , similar things happen for Bob's qubit. Here, we assume that Alice and Bob keep their results of the measurement handy on condition that they observe E(e t ) A and E(e t ) B with the same e t . Contrastingly, we assume that Alice and Bob discard their results of the detections on condition that they carry out their observations with different axes from each other, that is to say, E(e t ) A and E(e t ′ ) B with t = t ′ . Moreover, we assume that Alice produces the maximally entangled state by herself instead of the source and sends the single qubit of the pair to Bob. Then, this process and the six-state protocol are in exactly the same situation [25] .
In this process, Alice and Bob cooperate in the measurement of the following quantity:
If Eve eavesdrops on neither of the qubits, Eq. (90) holds. Next, we think the value of S defined in Eq. (90) on condition that Eve interferes in both the qubits that are sent to Alice and Bob, respectively. Here, temporarily, we assume that the maximally entangled state is generated not by Alice but by the source and Eve makes the intercept/resend attacks on the quantum channel between the source and Alice and that between the source and Bob. Moreover, for the sake of convenience, we assume that Eve mounts the intercept/resend attacks on both the quantum channels independently.
Eve intercepts the qubit sent to Alice, performs an orthogonal measurement with E(n a ) A on it, and resends an alternative qubit to Alice according to the result obtained by the observation. Similarly, Eve intercepts the qubit sent to Bob, makes an orthogonal measurement with E(n b ) B on it, and resends an alternative qubit to Bob depending on the result obtained by the measurement.
In these processes, we put E(n) = n · σ as shown in Eq. (89). Moreover, we assume that n a and n b are arbitrary normalized real three-component vectors. If |n| = 1, E(n) is a Hermitian operator which has two eigenvalues ±1 and its eigenvectors are given by |ϕ(n) 0 = 1
We let ρ(n a , n b ) represent a probability that Eve chooses n a and n b . This probability distribution satisfies the following relations,
dn a dn b ρ(n a , n b ) = 1.
Writing a probability that Eve detects |ϕ(n a ) i A ⊗ |ϕ(n b ) j B for |Ψ − AB as P Eve (n a , i; n b , j) with i, j ∈ {0, 1}, we obtain it in the form,
Then, because P Eve (n a , i; n b , j) is a probability, it satisfies the following relations,
i∈{0,1} j∈{0,1} P Eve (n a , i; n b , j) = 1.
When Eve detects |ϕ(n a ) i A ⊗ |ϕ(n b ) j B , she sends these states to Alice and Bob as the pair of the qubits. Then, if Alice and Bob observe E(e t ) A and E(e t ) B respectively, an expectation value of a product of outputs produced by the detections of E(e t ) A and E(e t ) B is given by
where A(n a , i; e t ) and B(n b , j; e t ) are expectation values of Alice and Bob's observations respectively and we can write down them in the form,
Here, we confirm that Eve's intercept/resend attack is equivalent to the hidden variable model for Alice and Bob. First of all, Eve obtains four physical quantities, n a , n b , i, and j. Thus, these four quantities are hidden variables. We can regard these four hidden variables as random ones and their probability distribution is given bỹ ρ(n a , n b , i, j) = ρ(n a , n b )P Eve (n a , i; n b , j). (n a , n b , i, j) = 1.
Describing an expectation value of the product of the outputs obtained by Alice and Bob's observations with E(e t ) A and E(e t ) B asC(e t , e t ), we can write down it as
(n a , n b , i, j)A(n a , i; e t )B(n b , j; e t ). 
Under this hidden variable model, the quantity S in Eq. (90) corresponds to the following physical value:S ′ = C (e x , e x ) +C(e y , e y ) +C(e z , e z ) . 
As a result of the above discussion, we attain the following conclusion. On the one hand, if Eve mounts the intercept/resend attack, Alice and Bob's observations are described with the hidden variable model and the inequalityS ′ ≤ 1 is satisfied. On the other hand, if Eve does not interfere in Alice and Bob's quantum transmission, S = 3 holds and Alice and Bob's detections violate the inequality for the hidden variable model. Furthermore, if Eve does not touch the qubit sent to Alice and launches the intercept/resend attack only on the qubit travelling towards Bob, we have the probability ρ(n a , n b ) = δ(n a − e t )ρ(n b ) andS ′ is given bȳ
where we use 0 ≤ ρ(n b ) ≤ 1, (108)
On this occasion, the inequalityS ′ ≤ 1 holds, too.
Here, we consider the following problem. If Eve makes the collective attack only on the qubit that the source sends to Bob, what is the value of S? In this problem, we pay attention to the fact that Eve does not interfere in the qubit sent to Alice. Then, we can expect Eve to make the optimum collective attack obtained in Sec. 4.
According to the considerations given in Sec. 4 for Eve's optimum strategy, Eve let the qubit sent to Bob develop as follows:
We assume that the maximally entangled state emitted by the source changes into the following form because of Eq. (110):
Then, the following relation holds: 
Finally, from Eqs. (106) and (113), we can conclude that we cannot describe the collective attack as the hidden variable model for D < 1/3.
Discussion and the conclusions
In Sec. 3, we acquire Eve's optimum strategy of the intercept/resend attack on the sixstate protocol. This is a new result. In actual fact, an article in which Eve's best strategy of the intercept/resend attack on the six-state protocol is examined has not been published yet. In Sec. 3, when we look for Eve's optimum strategy of the intercept/resend attack, we do not perform parameter optimization. By contrast, in order to show that the Breidbart basis is optimum for the intercept/resend attack in the BB84 scheme, we have to carry out parameter optimization [4] . From these facts, we notice that we can discover Eve's best strategy for the six-state protocol more easily than the BB84 scheme. This is because the six-state protocol has more constraints than the BB84 scheme, so that the optimization problem for the six-state protocol becomes simpler than the BB84 scenario.
In the analyses of the collective attack, we become aware that the problem concerning the six-state protocol is more simplified than that about the BB84 scheme, too. According to Cirac and Gisin's results, in order to examine the security of the BB84 scheme against the collective attack, they imposed Eq. (35) for the z and x bases and the following condition upon Eve's unitary operator U [21] :
for i, j, k, l ∈ {0, 1}.
Then, Eve's unitary operator is characterized by two real parameters. Contrastingly, in Sec. 4 of the current paper, only by assuming Eq. (4) with F = F ′ and Eq. (35), we can describe Eve's unitary operator U with a single real parameter. When the authors of the present paper calculated the matrix elements of U, they expected that Eve's best strategy was characterized by two or more real parameters. Actually, the authors of the present paper predicted that the number of real parameters of U for the six-state protocol was equal to or larger than that for the BB84 scheme. On the contrary, even if we assume Eq. (35), Eve's optimum strategy is characterized only with a single real parameter. This fact implies that the number of bases utilized during quantum communication of the six-state protocol is larger than that of the BB84 scheme and many constraints restrict Eve's strategy.
From the calculations carried out in Sec. 4, we obtain the following relation: E t 00 |E t 01 = E t 00 |E t 10 = E t 11 |E t 01 = E t 11 |E t 10 = 0 for t ∈ {x, y, z}.
This relation is equivalent to Bechmann-Pasquinucci and Gisin's condition which is applied to Eve's unitary operator U [2] . Strictly speaking, Bechmann-Pasquinucci and Gisin imposed a condition that the fidelity was given by F with the t basis ∀t ∈ {x, y, z} and Eq. (115) upon Eve's unitary operator.
In the current paper, we assume Eq. (35) for identifying Eve's unitary operator U. Equation (35) suggests that the unitary operator U acts symmetrically on the t basis ∀t ∈ {x, y, z} that Alice and Bob choose for communication through the quantum channel, that is to say, effects caused by U are preserved for an arbitrary t basis. Thus, the physical meaning of Eq. (35) is very general and fundamental.
Contrastingly, Eq. (115) which was imposed upon Eve's unitary operator U by Bechmann-Pasquinucci and Gisin has the following ideas. First, the relation E t 00 |E t 01 = E t 11 |E t 10 = 0 involved in Eq. (115) assumes that Eq. (31) is given in the form of the Schmidt decomposition [23] . We think that this assumption is not obvious under these circumstances. Second, the relation E t 00 |E t 10 = E t 11 |E t 01 = 0 included in Eq. (115) puts us in the following situation. On the one hand, Eve obtains the state |E t 00 on condition that Alice sends |0 t and Bob detects |0 t . On the other hand, Eve gains the state |E t 10 only if Alice sends |1 t and Bob observes |0 t . The relation implies both these states are orthogonal to each other, namely, E t 00 |E t 10 = 0. We cannot conceive of this assumption immediately and it forces Eve's unitary operator U into satisfying very high symmetry.
We can understand this fact well by letting t = z for Eq. (4), assuming F = F ′ , and bringing Eq. (115) into effect. In this case, we obtain the following relation straightforwardly: A|B = A|D = B|C = C|D = 0.
Putting this relation and Eqs. (11) , (13) , (14) , and (15) Bruß obtained together, we become aware that we impose very severe conditions upon Eve's unitary operator U. Summing up the above arguments, we understand that we apply simpler symmetry to Eve's unitary operator U in the present paper than Bechmann-Pasquinucci and Gisin. In Ref. [2] , Bechmann-Pasquinucci and Gisin showed that Eve's unitary operator U was characterized by a single real parameter as shown in Eqs. (67) and (69) and obtained Eq. (66). Thus, although Ref. [2] and the current paper impose different conditions upon Eve's collective attack, both lead to the same optimum strategy for Eve. Hence, to derive Eve's best tactic, we do not need to apply high symmetry to Eve's attack. This is a new result of the present paper.
Eve's unitary operator U is defined on a four-dimensional Hilbert space, so that it contains fifteen real parameters, essentially. However, it is very difficult for us to optimize these fifteen parameters at the same time. Thus, we need to reduce the number of parameters by applying specific symmetry to the unitary operator U. The reference written by Bechmann-Pasquinucci and Gisin and the current paper impose different symmetry upon U and find the same optimum strategy for Eve. This is the important significance of the current paper. Bechmann-Pasquinucci and Gisin's work and the present paper are complementary to each other and the result of both of them implies that Eve's best strategy obtained is correct.
In Sec. 6, we discuss the connection between the six-state protocol and the E91 scheme.
